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Children – too lean and short for their age, and with
oversized heads from which vivid eyes shine …
(Arvind Adiga in The White Tiger – winner of
the 2008 Booker Prize)
1 Introduction
India has the highest level of child
undernutrition in the world, along with
Bangladesh and Nepal. Half of India’s 150
million children under six years of age are
underweight, and progress has particularly
slowed down in recent years. Between the
National Family Health Survey (NFHS-3 in 2005)
and the NFHS-2 (1998) there has been hardly
any progress – the proportion of underweight
children under three years of age came down by
a mere 1 per cent – from 47 per cent to 46 per
cent (GoI 2007d). Worse still, child
undernutrition in two of the bigger states, Bihar
and Madhya Pradesh (MP) has increased
between the NFHS-2 and NFHS-3.
This is a poor record by any standards. But when
it happens in a country that is blazing the
economic growth trail – with at least an average
rate of over 6 per cent – in the last 15 years –
something is seriously wrong. Achieving Inclusive
Growth is the focus of India’s Eleventh Five-Year
Plan – and without making progress on
undernutrition, it cannot be achieved.
Why is India’s track record in tackling child
undernutrition so poor? Is it primarily because
the political priority to tackle child nutrition has
remained weak? Is it principally because
nutrition has remained the orphan child of
policymaking – relegated to the exclusive
domain of the 34-year-old Integrated Child
Development Scheme (ICDS: http://wcd.nic.in)1
– that aims to achieve too many things with too
few resources and without much accountability
for results? Although successful in many ways,
the ICDS scheme has failed to make a significant
dent in reducing the proportion of underweight
children, which continues to be one of the
highest in the world (GoI 2007e). Is it because
the public service delivery mechanism to tackle
health and nutrition has not changed even with
significantly higher financial allocations?2
It is now widely accepted that for any public
programme to deliver well for the poor and
socially excluded, governance plays a central
role. Governance is the exercise of political
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authority and the use of institutional resources
to manage society’s problems and affairs (World
Bank 1991). Since governance is at the heart of
setting out public policy priorities, resource
allocation and utilisation of public resources – it
plays a crucial role in producing socially
desirable outcomes. ‘Disadvantaged’ groups,
especially the scheduled castes, the scheduled
tribes and other minorities, must feel they have
an equal stake and should perceive an adequate
flow of benefits to ensure the legitimacy of the
state (GoI 2007b).
This article puts a governance lens on India’s
current approach to tackling undernutrition
through the Department for International
Development’s (DFID) framework of state
capability, accountability and responsiveness. We
analyse state capability in terms of strength of
political leadership to tackle undernutrition and
to mobilise cross government actions which are
essential to tackle child undernutrition. We then
assess the accountability for results in ICDS –
India’s foremost programme for children under
six years of age, tasked to provide pre-school
education to children and to break the vicious
cycle of malnutrition, morbidity, reduced
learning capacity and mortality. ICDS is assessed
on infrastructure, staff vacancies, supplementary
nutrition, planning and monitoring systems and
gender and nutrition and health education
(NHE). Finally, we analyse state responsiveness,
particularly with respect to the Right-to-Food
(RTF) campaign that has taken a legal route to
advocacy by successfully petitioning the Supreme
Court (SC) to direct the GoI to improve the
functioning of ICDS – with a special focus on the
disadvantaged sections of the population.
2 Child undernutrition in India: benefits of
economic growth bypass the socially excluded
India’s children are in a state of humanitarian
emergency, with about 75 million of them being
undernourished. Eight states in India bear a
lion’s share of the burden.3 For this article, we
use data mostly from four states – Bihar, Madhya
Pradesh, Orissa and West Bengal. These four
states cover 25 per cent of India’s population
(Census of India 2001).
The picture is exacerbated by significant
inequalities across states and socioeconomic
groups – girls, rural areas, the poorest and
scheduled tribes and castes are the worst
affected – and these inequalities appear to be
increasing (World Bank 2005). A child born in
the poorest household is three times as likely to
die before she reaches her fifth birthday
compared with a child born in the richest
household (UNICEF/KPMG 2008).
Children from the marginalised groups such as
scheduled tribes/scheduled castes (ST/SC)
households are significantly worse off (refer to
Table 1). Undernutrition rates are higher among
young girls4; and for SC and ST women, these
rates are alarming – 56 per cent and 65 per cent,
respectively. Young and undernourished mothers
especially from ST/SC groups are likely to give
birth to underweight babies that have serious
intergenerational equity implications.
It is now well understood that more than 15
years of rapid economic growth has not helped
much in tackling undernutrition, especially for
the socially excluded groups. The immediate
story is about poor resource allocation to ICDS.
Even as late as in 2005 – after ten continuous
years of high economic growth – the total
budgetary allocation for ICDS (national and
state government combined) was Rs. 45 billion.
Counting the 150 million children under six
years of age that ICDS targets, this means
government allocates Rs. 300/child annually –
less than Rs. 1/day. However, resources for ICDS
have been increased by 30–40 per cent in the last
4–5 years. This has been possible because of very
high revenue growth in recent years in India.
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Table 1 Malnutrition statistics by caste/tribe, India – NFHS-3
Scheduled Scheduled Other backward Other
caste tribe castes
Children under 3 years who are stunted (%) 44.1 44.3 39.2 31.1
Children under 3 years who are wasted (%) 20.5 25.7 18.9 16.4
Children under 3 years who are underweight (%) 52.2 56.7 46.4 37.3
The impact of such higher resource allocation to
ICDS is yet to be ascertained. We argue in this
article that unless governance challenges pay
more attention to tackling undernutrition, such
higher resource allocations will not necessarily
result in more desirable nutritional outcomes.
3 The governance framework
Improving governance is seen as central to
improving public service delivery. It is critical for
addressing corruption, human rights abuse,
social exclusion and gender inequality, and for
reducing the risk of violent conflict and
instability (DFID 2007).
For the purpose of this article, we use DFID’s
governance framework (Figure 1) that uses three
parameters of capability, accountability and
responsiveness.
Since this framework has been operationalised
through Country Governance Analysis (CGA) in
several DFID supported countries, we are
confident about the practical usefulness of this
three-dimensional framework (DFID 2008).
3.1 State capability
Political leadership
State capability is a function of political
leadership. The political leadership to tackle
undernutrition in India has not been strong
enough. Only 3 per cent of questions raised in
Parliament, during the last four years relate to
children (Working Group on Children Under Six
2007). About 1 per cent of the Union Budget is
spent on children under six years of age
(UNICEF 2007). Media scan reveals very few
concrete policy pronouncements from the
political leadership on undernutrition. ‘… Health
and well being of children is really not a priority
with political parties’ (Ramachandran 2005).
Due to the lack of high level political leadership,
25 years after the introduction of ICDS, the
Supreme Court of India had to intervene and
provide several directives since 2001 to provide
improved coverage and quality of nutrition and
health services especially to disadvantaged
groups.
However, since the publication of the NFHS-3
findings in 2007 – and in the backdrop of India’s
growing stature as an economic power – there
seems to be a spurt in political pressure on the
government to tackle undernutrition on an
urgent basis. This pressure to act comes from the
Planning Commission within the government and
from the civil society advocacy movement, the
media and multilateral agencies from outside.
The Prime Minister (PM) forcefully articulated
the need to improve nutrition statistics in his
Independence Day speech on 15 August 2008 –
‘The problem of malnutrition is a curse that we
must remove’ – and in the week before
announced the establishment of the PM’s
National Council on India’s Nutrition Challenges.
The PM’s Council has the potential to place
nutrition at the heart of government priority with
support coming from the Planning Commission
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Figure 1 The DFID’s governance framework
Source DFID (2007).
State capability
= the ability and authority of leaders,
governments and public organisations to get
things done
Responsiveness
= how leaders, governments and public
organisations actually behave in responding to
the needs and rights of citizens
Accountability
= the ability of citizens, civil society and the
private sector to hold leaders, government and
public organisations to account
Good governance
and the Women and Child Development (WCD)
Ministry. Also, in recent months there has been
greater priority accorded to designing an
Integrated Child Protection Scheme (with
nutrition as one of the focus areas) and then
there is the ICDS IV that takes a more targeted
approach to addressing child undernutrition for
children under two years of age. The PM’s
Council is yet to make any major policy impact
and with national elections intervening – things
will be on hold for some time. Hopefully, once the
new government is formed, the PM’s Council will
be retained and activated to breathe new life into
the government’s child undernutrition agenda.
Such an apex body should drive the agenda
nationally so that state governments respond to a
coherent national plan.
Some lessons may be learnt from the recent
actions taken on the Climate Change agenda –
another difficult cross-government issue – in
which India’s National Action Plan on Climate
Change has resulted in the setting up of eight
inter-sectoral Missions to get the entire
government to respond coherently. When
compared with the advocacy blitz on climate
change in terms of media space and the support
provided by the international development
agencies, undernutrition pales in comparison.
This points to a need for the stepping up of
advocacy efforts by each of the actors and also
calls for a greater joining up of Indian civil
society forces and international agencies to
advocate for a stronger policy response on
tackling undernutrition.
Cross-government action
India’s undernutrition problem is deeply rooted in
vast poverty. About 456 million Indians live on less
than the international poverty line set at US$1.25
a day (World Bank 2009) and 900 million live on
less than US$2 a day (DFID 2008), and in
international comparison, India is facing alarming
hunger – ranked 66th among 88 countries on the
global hunger index. There is a high level of basic
hunger in poorer areas and among the socially
excluded groups. Sanitation conditions are very
poor (with coverage not more than 30–40 per cent
across the country). In rural India, 84 per cent of
the population defecate in the open and 17 per
cent in urban areas do so (UNICEF 2009).
Until recently, food insecurity was viewed as the
primary cause of malnutrition in India. However,
research shows that exposure to repeated
infections, inadequate utilisation of health
services, poor sanitation, inappropriate child
feeding/caring practices, especially in the first
two years of life, and the low status of women are
among the key factors contributing to high
malnutrition in India (GoI 2007c). Half of Indian
children are underweight and live in hungry
households; they are not fully immunised, are
exposed to high levels of unsanitary conditions
and fall into a cycle of high morbidity (and
mortality), undernutrition and infections. The
inter-sectoral nature of the problem requires
coordinated and effective cross-government
action.
But state capability to organise cross-government
actions to tackle undernutrition is weak. A
number of cross-government strategies at the
state level on undernutrition is not
operationalised effectively. The state level
committees on ICDS have not been effective.
This is not surprising, since overall political
priority is weak. The Chief Ministers or other
senior Ministers who play lead roles in cross-
government coordination on priority matters for,
e.g. investment promotion and industrialisation,
do not get much involved in ICDS matters. As a
result, undernutrition remains relegated only to
ICDS – a scheme that sits within WCD – and
operates vertically downwards from the national
government to the state/district level with few
interlinkages with health, local government,
education, water and sanitation and public
distribution sectors.
3.2 Accountability for results – ICDS
Stronger accountability in public service delivery
should lead to better outcomes. In this section,
we assess accountability for results in ICDS on
infrastructure, personnel, supplementary nutrition
programme, gender, nutrition and health education and
planning and monitoring. It is the only programme
addressing the care, education, health and
nutrition concerns of children under six. ICDS5
addresses a range of children’s needs under one
umbrella through a network of more than 1
million Anganwadi centres (AWC or centres)6 at
the village/urban slum level.
Infrastructure
ICDS envisages Anganwadi centres to be safe,
hygienic and attractive places for children to
grow, play and learn.
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Table 2 reveals that a high percentage of AWCs
do not have a proper building and many are held
in the open. Two-thirds of ICDS buildings
operate from rented premises which invariably
are in the upper caste locality thus favouring
their children and neglecting lower caste
children (Saxena and Ravi 2005, NAC papers).
With almost no drinking water and toilets and
poor infrastructure in the AWCs, the plight of
small children can be well imagined. The Women
and Child Development (WCD) Ministry reports
that a survey by National Council of Applied
Economic Research (NCAER)7 covering a
number of states found 45 per cent of AWCs do
not have toilet facilities and only 39 per cent
reported having a hand pump. Various field visits
corroborate this story.
Simply put, the main centre of programme
delivery of ICDS is crumbling and contributes to
the low uptake of ICDS. The percentage of
children receiving any benefits from the AWC is
32.9 per cent (NFHS 3). The government has
been active in increasing the number of AWCs
over the years; but so far, not enough urgency is
visible in getting the infrastructure of AWCs up to
the required norms and to make them
operationally effective and attractive. Evidence on
the quality of infrastructure of the new ICDS
centres is not yet available in any systematic form.
Personnel
ICDS is a human resource intensive programme
with 35–50 per cent of its budget spent on
personnel. It employs about 2 million anganwadi
workers (AWW) and helpers at the front-line
who deliver the ICDS package of services. They
are supported by supervisors (supervising 20–30
centres in each sector). The first line of
management support is provided by Child
Development Project Officers (CDPOs) posted
at the block level (covering a population of
100,000–200,000).
Table 3 reveals high levels of vacancies in
CDPOs and supervisors who are responsible for
providing operational support to the AWW. In
MP, performance review by CAG notes ‘The work
of assisting and guiding the AWWs, mobilising
and motivating beneficiaries, coordination
between AWWs and CDPOs was adversely
affected as 549 posts (about 25 per cent) of
Supervisors were vacant’. Similar observations
have been made by CAG for the three other
states. However, things are changing in Bihar,
which shows renewed political priority for
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Table 2 AWC infrastructure
Bihar Madhya Pradesh Orissa West Bengal
AWCs without proper 43% running 74% 53% in non- 10% running in the open without 
building/space in huts departmental shelter and 83% in various other places 
buildings such as clubs, attached verandahs, 
temporary sheds
Without drinking water 97% 55% 64% 62%
Without toilets 98% 45% 99% 94%
Source Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) Reports (2005–07).
Table 3 Vacancies in operational staff
Bihar Madhya Pradesh Orissa West Bengal
CDPOs 66% 50–75% 30% 26%
Supervisors 86% 25% 39% 35%
AWWs 25% N/A 10% 5%
Statistical assistant 83% 50–83% N/A
Source Compiled from CAG reports/MPR.
recruitment of front-line public servants
including CDPOS, etc. West Bengal has also
made attempts to recruit in recent times.
We could not ascertain all the India figures on
vacancy positions because it is not available in
any easy form. However, based on the data
available from the four states it seems this is a
big problem that affects many other states. Since
these vacancies are proportionally more in the
‘underserved and hard-to-reach areas’, it
damages service delivery where it is acutely
required. ICDS IV too does not seem to be
designed to pay adequate attention to higher
level personnel issues beyond that of the AWWs.
Many State governments are mired in legal cases
related to recruitment, transfers and postings of
staff that delay deployment of the right people
where needed. Another stumbling block is the
lack of an integrated personnel information
system and almost non-existent personnel/
human resource sections within the department,
which deters any kind of proper planning. Most
ICDS departments are serviced by a manually
operated database of staff. As a result, ad hoc
measures are taken regarding deployment of
staff which usually means ‘easy’ posts are filled
up and posts in more remote/difficult areas are
not. Without staff in the posts, supervision and
performance management becomes meaningless.
To help solve this problem, governments need to
re-look at the whole range of personnel policy
covering recruitment, training, postings,
promotions and transfers on an urgent basis and
in an integrated manner. The adopted policies
should also be made transparent for them to be
fairly enforced. Without sorting out the higher
level personnel issues, delivery at the front-line
will be hard to improve and AWWs will continue
to be burdened with a heavy workload and
without adequate support (Box 1).
Supplementary Nutrition Programme (SNP) –
procurement and financial management
Supplementary nutrition is one of the most
important interventions of ICDS. As per the
Supreme Court Orders of 2004, all AWCs are
required to provide 300 days of supplementary
nutrition to all children, adolescent girls,
pregnant and lactating mothers. State
governments are responsible for the supply of
nutritious food for which the GoI provides 50 per
cent reimbursement. A national level evaluation
by the National Institute of Public Cooperation
and Child Development (NIPCCD) in 2006
reveals that only 45 per cent of registered children
receive supplementary nutrition (GoI 2007a).
Table 4 reveals that feeding interruptions at the
AWC level is serious – ranging from a few days to
few months. No AWC could provide more than
225 days – far short of the mandatory 300 days of
feeding during the tenth five-year plan
(2002–2007) in Bihar. NFHS-3 found that
supplementary nutrition coverage of under-three
year-old children across the country was only 26
per cent. Field reports/visits reveal feeding
interruption is more in the remote and hard to
reach, tribal blocks.
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Box 1 Anganwadi workers – carrying a nation’s burden
At the front-line, ICDS is delivered by an Anganwadi woman worker and her assistant who
draw honoraria ranging from Rs. 1,000 to Rs. 2,000. CAG test checked reports suggest
AWWs are often assigned some additional duties not related to the ICDS scheme such as
general census, literacy programme, identification of disabled children, survey of
tuberculosis, leprosy, AIDS and malaria patients, revision of electoral rolls and photo-
identity cards, survey works of PHCs and formation of self-help groups, etc. And then there
are her main duties which is the heavy workload of record keeping in at least ten formats,
arranging and managing supplementary nutrition, making home visits, holding womens’
group meetings, giving health counselling, organising cooking classes for women and
teaching about 30–60 pre-school children!
The question needs to be asked – how much can an AWW deliver even if she did her best?
Because of vacancies in higher levels and lack of supportive supervision and the
multiplicity of tasks that she is required to perform, the AWW is the link in the delivery
chain where the heaviest responsibility is concentrated. It is as if the entire nation’s
responsibility to combat undernutrition has been delegated to this ‘honorary worker’.
Feeding interruptions at AWC level is a direct
consequence of two important and interrelated
governance issues in public service delivery –
procurement and financial management. There
is no uniform procurement policy for ICDS
commodities. In many states, government
corporations are engaged to provide SNP without
any competitive basis which is a reflection of
poor procurement policy. Contract arrangements
that include a number of sub-contracts are
complex. Monitoring of contract performance is
usually not well documented.
Then there is pilferage, wastage and lack of
quality assurance in the supplementary nutrition
programme. ‘One of the reasons why the
supplementary feeding does not reach the
children is the fact that the entire feeding
programme over the years has been passed into
the hands of the private contractors who
supplied ready to eat food powders that were
culturally inappropriate, calorifically inadequate
and in many cases, never reached the ICDS at
all’ (Saxena and Mander 2007). Media reports
regularly mention the diversion of ICDS
commodities into the open market. At times,
rates fixed by government for rice and pulses are
below the market rate. But audit reports found
that purchases were made at uniform
government rates, which raises doubts about
quality, quantity and actual coverage of
beneficiaries (CAG reports).
CAG is the Supreme Audit Institution of India,
with branches in every state head quarters. It
undertakes audits of government departments
and public sector entities. Increasingly, because
of the heavy workload, CAG audits of a
particular department are bunched – covering
3–5 years in one go. This naturally creates delays
and makes it difficult to respond to the findings.
CAG report findings are taken up for discussion
by the Public Accounts Committee to hold the
executive to account. In general, CAG audits are
considered of good quality, but because of the
bunching of several years and the lack of strong
follow-up from the PAC (because of delays and
heavy workload), are considered largely
ineffective in enforcing accountability.
The problem of finances starts with the
budgeting process which is historically
incremental and with an annual horizon and
therefore limited flexibility. Then there is a
major problem around the fund flows from the
state to the front-line at the project levels. In
many states, CDPOs report receiving funds late
in the year. Due to weak accounting capacities
within ICDS, statements of expenditure are not
submitted on time which delays further
instalments. In addition to the weak accounting,
internal audit systems are weak or non-existent.
Due to a combination of such factors, the
financial system performs poorly and does not
support the programme in general and
procurement payments in particular.
Delays in payments to the suppliers is another
major reason for the interruption in supplies.
Due to non-streamlined financial management
within the department, payments are delayed
and suppliers run up huge bills. The suppliers
then do not provide commodities until previous
dues are cleared. As a result, feeding
interruption takes place almost on a cyclical
basis. CAG reviews mention these problems time
and again. But responsiveness to the CAG
observations is not very high. And because of
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Table 4 No. of days of feeding provided by AWCs
No of days of Bihar (100 AWCs Madhya Pradesh Orissa West Bengal (test check 
supplementary test checked sample of 442 AWCs)
nutrition provided sample)
0–100 46% Food interruptions ranged 4% 69% AWCs provided 
100–200 47% from several days to several 36% between 26–150 days
200–225 7% months in Sehore, Mandla, 60% (200–300 3–8 months’ feeding 
Vidisha and Damoh districts. days) interruption in 981 AWCs
300 days None
Source Compiled from various CAG reports.
many years of backlog of CAG reports, the Public
Accounts Committee is not able to fix
accountability for lapses (Box 2).
The recent cabinet decision to provide hot
cooked meals across ICDS in the country can be
used as a lever to provide new policy directions to
the state governments on supplementary
nutrition that takes into account value for
money, timeliness in supplies and quality
assurance and monitoring of performance. The
financial system too needs strengthening to
support the programme in general and
procurement in particular.
Nutrition and health education and gender
ICDS has an important role in promoting
nutrition and health education (NHE). NHE is a
critical package of interventions containing
information/counselling on a range of issues,
such as: age of marriage/first child, importance
of full immunisation, infant-feeding practices,
complementary feeding, rest and care during
pregnancy, which can all improve behaviours and
positively impact on undernutrition.
Whether the NHE is followed well depends to a
large extent on the awareness and status of
women and their decision-making power in the
family. Illiteracy among women and lack of
exposure to media are emerging as important
variables for malnutrition (Nair 2007).8 Studies
confirm that women’s status impacts
significantly on child nutrition because women
with higher status have better nutritional status
themselves, are better cared for and provide
higher quality care to their children (IFPRI
2003), and there is an inverse relationship
between violence against women and the
nutritional status of women.9
In general, ICDS and AWW priorities are
managing food supplementation for children,
rather than nutrition and health education.10 The
AWW has neither the time nor motivation to
focus on NHE and on mothers’ meetings due to
their heavy workload. NHE is failing also because
the AWW and ANM are not joining up effectively
to provide critical behaviour change messages.
The coordination with the health department is
only effective in some cases.11 Many reports show
that mothers do not feel motivated to attend the
monthly meetings, and there is a large variation
in the average attendance at the monthly
meetings (20–60 per cent).
Interventions to encourage good caring
behaviours are found to be cost-effective but
require greater effort, support and capacity
building of the anganwadi workers, which has not
been a focus of the ICDS. ICDS IV with the focus
on children under two years of age should devote
resources to building the capacity of AWW for
managing Behaviour Change Communication
(BCC) and also should provide a second AWW to
reduce workloads. While the first AWW can
focus on early childhood education and work
closely with the Education Department to
develop such skills and capacity to deliver early
education of the 3–6 year olds,12 the second AWW
could strengthen the health and nutrition
linkages for the under twos and outreach socially
excluded groups. Effective BCC can be delivered
at scale, as demonstrated by CARE India’s
Integrated Nutrition and Health Project II
(INHP II) evaluation which highlighted the gains
from targeting behaviour change interventions at
the youngest children (under twos) and pregnant
women, with the greatest impact on exclusive
breast-feeding and neonatal care practices
(CARE 2008).
Planning and monitoring
Monitoring is one of the weak links in ICDS. In
Bihar, the CAG 2007 reports that basic statistical
information, such as birth weight, maternal
mortality rate, infant mortality rate,
institutional delivery and enrolment of children
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Box 2 Transportation problems beyond the interior areas
Agents usually supply supplementary food commodity up to the block level and then it is
left to the meagre resources of the anganwadi worker or disorganised private agents to
transport the commodities to the AWC. In a situation where the distances of some villages
from the block is 50–100 km, this plays havoc with the supplies leading to feeding
interruptions especially in the remote and far-off villages precisely where the
supplementary nutrition is needed more.
in regular schools after pre-school education for
planning, was unavailable with the Directorate
in Bihar (CAG 2007). No growth chart was found
in any of the test-checked AWCs in Bihar.
In MP, it was noted that the data in the Monthly
Progress Report (MPR) was not reviewed at any
level. For instance, infant mortality was reported
as almost nil in the MPRs while infant mortality
rate (IMR) in the districts (Damoh, Mandla and
Vidisha) was 75.8–96 per 1,000 live births during
2004–05 (CAG Performance Review 2005–06).
Orissa reviews by CAG noted that the
monitoring of progress in ICDS was poor. The
committees at the state and district levels did
not record and analyse progress properly. It was
found that visits by CDPO Supervisors to the
AWCs were inadequate and some AWCs were
never visited by CDPOs in a span of three years.
At the AWC level, except for immunisation data
and information on SNP, other data related to
NHE growth charts were very poor.
Where AWWs have been supported to monitor
the growth better, the weighting efficiency has
improved leading to better monitoring and
effective action for underweight children to gain
weight (Box 3). ICDS IV pays special attention
to this area which is encouraging.
Overall, there is little focus on putting the
beneficiary at the centre of service delivery
through ICDS in terms of planning and
monitoring. No clear transparency standards are
followed and actively disseminated to ensure
beneficiaries are aware of entitlements and
service quality. As a result, most communities
especially those belonging to marginalised
groups, do not have a clear idea about the
multiple objectives of ICDS. A majority of
perceptions equate ICDS with the provision of
supplementary nutrition only. This not only
damages the accountability relationship between
the ICDS and the communities but also fails to
create a compact between the serving institution
and the community.
3.3 Responsiveness
The Right-to-Food (RTF) Campaign
spearheaded by the People’s Union for Civil
Liberties (PUCL) in India, which is a broad
coalition of civil society, activists and academics,
has succeeded in placing hunger at the centre of
development discourse in India. The campaign
has successfully advocated through the legal
route to get the Supreme Court to direct the
Indian government to improve the functioning of
ICDS by adopting specific measures. On 28
November 2001, the Supreme Court first
directed the central and state governments to
ensure that there is a functional anganwadi ‘in
every settlement’.
The Supreme Court orders (Box 4) have focused
on addressing the equity issue by directing the
government to sanction more AWCs starting
with ST/SC habitations and urban slums and
move towards universalisation. It also introduced
the concept of AWC on demand.13 In line with
the approach of covering the last mile, the GoI
has been directed to operationalise 1.4 million
AWCs by December 2008, and GoI has
sanctioned 1.05 million AWCs and most of the
poor states have operationalised up to 95 per
cent of the sanctioned AWC. The GoI and state
governments have made tremendous efforts to
respond to the directives of the Supreme Court.
However, responding to the need for improved
quality of services provided by ICDS especially
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Box 3 Inclusive monitoring and planning (UNICEF/KPMG 2008)
In one of UNICEF’s supported districts in Jharkhand, with support from district
administration, weighing efficiency of children increased from 38 per cent to 75 per cent,
based on better monitoring. This monitoring is supported with simple monitoring tools,
and building the capacity of the AWW and community to use it effectively. 
UNICEF has supported the positive deviance model in Orissa, where the AWW and the
community monitor the weight of the children, the deviance from the normal growth,
learn how others manage to have normal weight babies and support effective action to
improve the weight of the underweight children. This proves that inclusive monitoring and
planning can help to significantly improve performance.
for the socially excluded groups is more
challenging. It is one thing to ‘open a centre’ in
the SC/ST habitations and it is quite another to
improve services there. Ramchandran14 (2005)
and Mander and Kumaran (2006) have found
evidence of social discrimination based on caste,
where the majority of the AWW were from a
higher caste (70–4 per cent) and they did not
provide adequate coverage to the low caste or
tribal hamlets or ignored them.
Quality improvements will require a
combination of governance changes such as more
representative staff from these lower castes,
better operational support to the AWW to be
responsive to the needs of those residing in
remote hamlets, better nutritional supplies and
effective monitoring to track the excluded
groups, etc.
There are several demand side constraints too;
from indifference in the society towards the
marginalised groups to active discrimination
against them. Attendance by children of a
particular caste appears to be influenced by the
caste of the anganwadi worker (World Bank 2005)
and also the venue of the AWC (if a religious
place or the houses of higher caste AWW, those
from lower castes are less likely to attend)
(Box 5).
Responsiveness to tackling social exclusion is
central to improving food and nutritional security.
In most places, the families that were excluded
from ICDS due to social discrimination or poverty
also tended to be excluded from other food
schemes. This exposes them to long periods of
uncertainties and denials (UNICEF/KPMG 2008).
Overall, it is found that 36 per cent of the poor
had no coverage under any food security schemes
as more than one-third of them did not have any
Below Poverty List (BPL) or Antodaya Card, and
this was worse for poor states like MP and Orissa
(42 per cent and 54 per cent of the poor did not
have these cards, respectively).15 Policy
responsiveness to such discrimination does not
seem to be very high on the agenda though the
RTF is making a difference.
Ultimately, institutional design for
responsiveness must strengthen local level
accountability. Panchayats could play an effective
role in holding the health and nutrition workers
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Box 4 Evidence of state responsiveness to advocacy
The secretariat which supports the Supreme Court appointed Commissioners has carried
out significant analytical work on ICDS in the last few years. As a result of this
institutionalised and persistent advocacy, significant impact has been achieved. This is a
special case as the legal route has been adopted while other advocacy efforts have not been
as effective.
Attributable to the advocacy campaign are the following changes: (1) increase in the
number of operational AWCs, especially in the underserved areas (going up from 600,000
AWCs in 2004 to 1.4 million in 2008); (2) universal eligibility for supplementary nutrition
instead of the Below Poverty Line (BPL) list; (3) quadrupling of budgets for every child in
the ICDS between 2004 and 2008 and (4) a recent clear cut policy decision to provide hot
cooked meals in all ICDS projects.
Box 5 Active social discrimination
Mandar and Kumaran (2006) studied social exclusion in ICDS in four States – Andhra
Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Uttar Pradesh. They found that a large number of
eligible children from impoverished and food-deprived households could not access ICDS.
The denial of these services is not random or accidental but is frequently the outcome of
active social discrimination based on caste, gender and disability. They did not find any
centre located in adivasi/dalit hamlets and there were subtle forms of discrimination by the
anganwadi worker service providers, e.g. missing out the homes of adivasis/dalits during the
rounds made to collect children to come to the centre (UNICEF/KPMG 2008).
accountable.16 NGOs like MV Foundation have
piloted models to build the capacity of the
Panchayats and Self-Help Groups (SHGs) to hold
ANM and AWW workers accountable for services
on the Fixed Health and Nutrition Days.
However, greater oversight of state level groups,
networks and organisations of the socially
excluded and marginalised are also needed to
ensure that local institutions actively respond to
the needs of the socially excluded. The United
Nation agencies and international NGOs could
support socially excluded groups to advocate for
appropriate models to support the government
to reduce child malnutrition in these
communities. The National Commission for the
Protection of Child Rights is playing an
important role in setting the framework for child
rights. Through its network of civil society
organisations (CSOs) and other networks, and
with effective use of media, it can create an
impetus to break the apathy of the general
public to this crisis, to expand the basic rights of
the child to include education and freedom from
hunger.
4 Conclusions and recommendations
It is easy to conclude that governance as usual will
not work to improve the nutritional outcomes for
75 million undernourished children in India. We
arrive at three main sets of conclusions and
recommendations.
The first main conclusion is that child
undernutrition is not a high political priority in
India. This however is changing and the
government is showing urgency in tackling the
issue. Since tackling undernutrition is still not a
strong political priority, one of the major
challenges is to advocate for positioning child
undernutrition at the top of the government’s
policy priorities. This will happen when advocacy
efforts are well joined up between civil society
groups and international agencies, building on
the guidelines of the Supreme Court and the
RTF campaign. The PM’s National Council, the
Planning Commission with support from WCD
should prepare a time-bound medium term (2–3
years) National Action Plan on tackling child
nutrition that requires all relevant sectors to
respond as a whole. This will have a knock-on
effect at the state and district levels and should
lead to more cross-government action on tackling
child undernutrition. An annual action-taken
report may be tabled in Parliament by the
government – which can be scrutinised by the
various interest groups and the media. Such an
institutional process will ensure continuous high
level focus on child undernutrition.
The second important conclusion is that ICDS in
its current design is not successful because it
neglects crucial governance issues such as
personnel management, procurement, financial
management and planning and monitoring for
results. Also there is a weak focus in ICDS on
reaching out to excluded groups. As a result, poor
people, especially those belonging to
marginalised and socially excluded groups cannot
effectively claim their rightful entitlements. A
number of programme delivery parameters need
to change and governance issues must be paid
more attention to in ICDS. The AWC
infrastructure is crumbling and particular
attention must be given to develop new AWCs as
per the norms with particular focus on
provisioning of drinking water and toilets. Social
audits must be undertaken to ensure norms are
adhered to. High levels of vacancies at the CDPO
and supervisory levels are damaging the
programme and must be reduced as a matter of
urgency. An overarching personnel policy must be
drawn up, made transparent and enforced
diligently to ensure remote and underserved
posts do not remain vacant for a long time. Steps
for better supervision and management support
should be also taken up.
Procurement and financial systems for
supplementary nutrition is not working, leading
to significant feeding interruptions. What is
needed is a transparent and effective
procurement policy that ensures value for money,
timeliness in supplies, quality assurance and
monitoring of performance. The latest Cabinet
decision to provide hot cooked meals should
provide that impetus. Financial management
systems should be overhauled, including
improved budgeting, accounting and audits.
Internal audits must be strengthened to improve
accounting and financial systems.
Responsiveness to external audits must be
improved so that observations made by CAG
reports are taken up effectively. The PAC must
be supported more strongly to enforce
democratic accountability.
Planning and monitoring systems in the ICDS
should be overhauled with a focus on stronger
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independent assessments, including beneficiary
feedback. Voices of socially excluded groups
through independent studies should complement
the existing monitoring and evaluation system.
These findings need to be published to keep up
the pressure for better performance. There must
be stronger accountability of ICDS district level
officers who need to be anchors of the
monitoring system. Currently, there is not
enough scrutiny of the system and therefore,
quality is poor. GoI too must play a stronger role
in quality-checking the MIS of ICDS and in
evaluating outcomes and impacts.
The final conclusion is that the Indian state is
becoming increasingly responsive to the rights
and entitlements of marginalised groups because
of internal policy changes, and also in response to
the pressure from advocacy groups mediated
through the Supreme Court. This needs to
continue with better collaborative mechanisms
between the state and civil society actors. In
addition, some specific steps may be taken for
enhancing responsiveness through the ICDS.
They are: (1) selection of appropriate AWWs
from the local community and from SC/ST
background with appropriate training and
support; (2) sensitisation of all AWWs supervisors
and CDPOs on social exclusion issues;
(3) dispersal of AWC/sub-centres to tribal or
caste hamlets; (4) capacity building and
sensitisation of supervisory cadres to track reach
of services for excluded social groups; (5)
provision of second AWW to focus on children
under two years of age; (6) improved capacity for
delivering higher quality of nutrition and health
education, including counselling on feeding
practices, information on balanced nutrition for
women and on violence against women.
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Notes
* The views expressed in this article are the
authors’ and do not necessarily represent the
views of DFID or of the organisation in which
they work.
1 Provides a package of six services:
supplementary nutrition, non-formal, pre-
school education, nutrition and health
education, immunisation, health check up and
referral services and nutrition. The last three
services are delivered in convergence with the
health department.
2 Montek S. Ahluwalia, Deputy Chairman,
Planning Commission of India makes a point
‘… somebody says child malnutrition is a
disgrace and it’s actually true, and then they
say well, we have this programme to take care
of child malnutrition, so let’s quadruple the
money we are spending on it. And the answer
is that that may not actually be what you need
to do. Just because a programme has child
malnutrition in its title doesn’t actually mean
that it’s relating to the critical interventions’.
3 The six large states are: Madhya Pradesh,
Bihar, Gujarat, Uttar Pradesh, Orissa and
Rajasthan and the two tribal states of
Jharkhand, Chattisgarh.
4 Some 47 per cent of adolescent girls aged
15–19 are undernourished, which reduces to
38 per cent for ages 20–29, NFHS-3.
5 Under this programme, children up to six
years old should be provided with 300 calories
and 8–10 g of protein; adolescent girls, 500
calories and 20–25 g of protein per day and
pregnant and nursing mothers, 500 calories
and 20–25 g of protein per day.
Undernourished children are entitled to
double the daily supplement provided
compared to the other children (600 calories
and/or special nutrients on medical
recommendation). It is a centrally sponsored
scheme with 100 per cent financial assistance
from GoI, except for 50 per cent of
supplementary nutrition, which is borne by
the state governments.
6 Norm – One Anganwadi centre should cover
1,000 general population and 700 tribal
population.
7 Covering 287,684 AWCs.
8 Malnourishment among children in India: a
regional analysis.
9 Latest research by S.V. Subramanian found
that one instance of domestic violence in the
previous year increased the likelihood of being
underweight by 21 per cent, as the sphere of
decision-making is affected, and associated
with higher levels of stress (Ackerson and
Subramanian 2008).
10 Overall pregnant and lactating women’s use
of AWC is very limited (22 per cent and 17 per
cent, respectively) and the main focus is on
supplementary food and very limited for
health and nutrition counselling (coverage of
11 and 8 per cent, respectively).
11 West Bengal’s strategy of regular 4th
Saturday meetings, whereby ICDS and Health
functionaries jointly assess their programmes
with the local gram panchayats seems to be
delivering results.
12 Tamil Nadu has developed good models for
early childhood education.
13 The Supreme Court in its order dated 13
December 2006 directed that rural
communities and slum dwellers should be
entitled to an ‘Anganwadi on demand’ (not
later than three months) from the date of
demand in cases where a settlement has at
least 40 children under six but no Anganwadi.
14 Two districts of UP over 70 per cent of AWW
were from higher caste or OBCs; in AP 74 per
cent of AWW sampled were from non-
scheduled groups.
15 Poor beneficiaries under four food schemes –
ICDS, Food for Work (FFW), Annapurna, Mid
Day Meal (MDM), according to NSS 2004–05.
16 In Kerala, Panchayats have played a major role
in overview and accountability of the ICDS
programme.
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